Enhancing Women's Electoral Representation through the Zebra List Model: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Indonesia and Argentina

Abstract

Efforts to improve women's political representation have become a global concern, particularly in countries with persistent gender gaps in the legislative bodies. This study explores the potential of adopting the Zebra List model, a candidate list system requiring alternating placement of male and female candidates, as a mechanism to enhance women's representation in Indonesia. By employing a comparative legal approach, this study analyzes the electoral frameworks of Indonesia and Argentina, with Argentina serving as a reference point because of its long-standing and successful implementation of the Zebra List model. This study examines key elements such as candidate nomination processes, rank-order rules, enforcement mechanisms, and sanction systems. Although Indonesia has adopted a 30% quota policy for female candidates, its lack of strict placement requirements and enforcement limits its effectiveness. In contrast, Argentina mandates alternating gender placements and imposes legal sanctions for non-compliance, resulting in significantly higher levels of female representation in its parliament. These findings suggest that the Zebra List model, when supported by robust legal and institutional frameworks, offers a viable strategy for Indonesia to achieve substantive gender parity in its electoral system. This study contributes to the ongoing discourse on electoral reform and gender equity by providing policy recommendations to enhance the design and implementation of gender quotas. Ultimately, it emphasizes the need for legal innovation and the political will to transform formal equality into actual representation.